罕见的APU SCU导致TRU灯亮

来自于网络公众号

某机落地接上APU GEN R后,关闭右发执行单发滑行,TR UNIT灯亮,机组检查发现TRU1无电,TRU2、3正常,接APU GEN L后TRU灯灭。

试车验证,试车数据如下:

验证的结果如下:

1)单开左发与APU,左发接1号汇流条,APU接2号汇流条,TRU灯亮。

2)单开右发与APU,右发接2号汇流条,APU接1号汇流条,TRU灯亮。

3)双发启动,左、右发分别接入1号2号汇流条,TRU灯灭。

4)通过对比其他飞机,发现一个异常。正常飞机的APU电流117V AC,正常,故障飞机的APU电流 127V AC明显过大

5)排故更换SCU后,APU供电电压115V变正常了,试车验证TRU故障消失了。

故障分析:

1、由最后排故结果倒推,双发同时供电时,APU电门(左或右)任一个接通,接通一侧的汇流条由APU供电,就会造成对侧发动机供电的汇流条TRU灯亮。整机都由APU供电,TRU灯就能恢复。整机由发动机供电TRU也正常。

2、结合电路原理可以得知电源之间是互相干扰的,输出电压高的会抑制输出电压低的,TRU又是对三相电较为敏感部件,所以其中一个TRU输出电流变小,就会导致TRU灯亮。

3、此次故障的主要原因是APU SCU调压功能失效,错误的将APU发电机输出电压调高到127V(正常应该是115V),一旦APU向单侧电网供电,另一侧的电网供向TRU的电就会被抑制,造成TRU电流变小,TR UNIT灯亮。

经验总结:

如果碰到TRU灯亮的故障,也可以检查一下GPU、APU、IDG的三相交流电压,如电压过高则不正常。

中央油箱的诸多最低油量要求

SR HNA-HNA-24-0819-03B

在手册中,对于中央油箱油量要求有诸多的限制,且各不相同,为此与波音做了沟通,不同油量究竟是出于什么要求。相关解释如下。

1, FIM 28-22 TASK 801(Center Tank Left Fuel Pump LOW PRESSURE Light is ON – Fault Isolation), it requires a minimum fuel of 14,000 lb (6350 kg) .

  • 14,000 lbs. is a minimum amount of fuel required in the center tank to ensure the fuel pump will re-prime and will developed fuel pressure for the test.

2, FIM 28-22 TASK 817(Center Tank, Left Boost Pump Circuit Breaker Open – Fault Isolation), it requires a minimum fuel of 20,000 lb (9072 kg)  .

  •  20,000 lbs. is to ensure the pump inlets are covered for safety to protect against introducing an ignition source/ electrical short in the fuel tank. Note that FIM 28-22 TASK 817 specifically addresses an open circuit breaker fault.

3, AMM 28-22-41-720-802(Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) – Operational Test), it requires a minimum fuel of 2000 lb (907 kg)  .

  •   2,000 lbs. is to ensure the fuel pump will not auto-shutoff.

4, AMM 28-22-00-730-801(Engine Fuel Feed Pumps – Functional Test), it requires a minimum fuel of 1000 lb (454 kg)  .

  •  2,000 lbs. is to ensure the fuel pump will not auto-shutoff – Note AMM** will be updated from 1,000 to 2,000 lbs of fuel.(This change is scheduled to be incorporated in the 15-Oct-2024 revision of the 737NG AMM.)

静变流机的TERMINAL BLOCK安装注意

2024年4月,有飞机反映ELEC灯亮,自检有静变流机故障,飞机更换新的静变流机后,检查发现静变流机的TERMINAL BLOCK COVER无法装上,进一步检查发现静变流机本体的负极接线桩有突出,导致TERMINAL BLOCK COVER无法装上,该接线桩无法拧回,且无松动。

需要注意的是磅力矩时正极和负极的力矩是不一样的。正极135-155,负极65-85。先磅的正极,紧接着磅负极时没调大小,将有可能将接线螺栓拉出。需安装中注意。

关于起飞超轮速的历次波音沟通

1、SR HNA-HNA-24-0385-02B

为什么只有落地超轮速的特检AMM 05-51-07-000-801,没有起飞超轮速的特检。具体该如何操作。

因为波音没有执行过起飞超轮速的试验。

Boeing has reviewed Hainan Airlines’ inquiry and offers the following response:

Boeing is aware that overspeed takeoffs occasionally occur in the fleet and it is rare to see a tire fail simply due to a mild overspeed takeoff event. The potential tire problems resulting from a mild overspeed takeoff condition are problems which can also arise without an overspeed event, as they are most likely due to an existing fault (such as an internal separation or a deep cut that could result in a peeled rib or an entire tread loss). Boeing is unaware of any wheel failures that have occurred due to a mild overspeed takeoff event.

Since there have been no tire overspeed takeoff design requirements imposed or qualification tests performed, Boeing cannot formally approve allowing a wheel/tire assembly with overspeed takeoffs to remain in service. However, because of the fleet service history noted above Boeing has no technical objection if, in lieu of removal, operators examine wheels/tires following a very mild overspeed takeoff event using the existing criteria in AMM 32-45-00 TASK 32-45-00-700-803 and if no damage is found return the airplane to service. In addition, Boeing recommends that the tire serial numbers be recorded and that the tire retreader be informed of the overspeed event history when the tires are returned for retread. If Hainan Airlines decides to do this inspection/return to service in lieu of replacement please note that Hainan Airlines has the responsibility to coordinate with the appropriate regulatory agency (or agencies) to obtain all necessary approvals. If Hainan Airlines elects instead to remove the tires, the normal tire change inspection interval criteria (per applicable CMM) for the wheels is recommended.

Boeing has published an article in its AERO magazine that covers this topic (see Ref /A/ file attached). We suggest that Hainan Airlines review this article and in particular the section on Maintenance Actions near the end of the article.

2、SR HNA-HNA-21-1111

当出现起落架超轮速后,会有什么结果,能否放行。(225轮胎,安监的监控值为185节)

波音认为从部分航司的实际操作看,2-3节并没有发生问题。波音不反对这种情况。对于225的胎,建议设置监控为195.5。

Boeing is aware that, in China, due to advances in flight data recorder technology that enables easier data acquisition, widespread recognition of tire-speed-limit exceedance events during takeoff has been materialized. However, we have to caution our airline customers against rash decisions such as setting a warning threshold value as the safety check line.

There are no standardized industry maintenance guidelines if a tire speed exceedance occurs during takeoff. If the overspeed was very small (2 to 3 knots over the tires’ speed limit), it is unlikely that the tires would have suffered any damage. Some operators have elected to simply examine the tires after an overspeed takeoff event using the normal tire inspection criteria in the Airplane Maintenance Manual. If no damage is found, the airplanes are dispatched normally and no further maintenance actions are performed. Based on many years of service experience, this approach seems to have worked well, and Boeing has typically not objected to this practice because very few, if any, tire tread losses have been attributed to an overspeed event.

Note that tire speed ratings and tire overspeed capabilities are provided in the approved Boeing AFMs for 737 MAX, 777, 787 and 747-400/-8. For example, the following statements are included in all AFMs published for the 737 MAX:

Approved tires with a speed rating of at least 235 mph and a one-time overspeed capability of 260 mph must be installed on the airplane to utilize the allowable tire speed limit of 232 mph in AFM-DPI.

An option exists in AFM-DPI to utilize a reduced tire speed limit of 225 mph for approved tires with a speed rating of at least 225 mph and a one-time overspeed capability of 250 mph.

When an aircraft is dispatched in accordance with certification and operational regulations, the calculated takeoff performance guarantees that the airplane’s ground speed at the liftoff during takeoff ground roll will not exceed the tire speed rating (e.g. 225 mph or 195.5 knots for 737NG), provided Boeing-recommended all-engine normal takeoff rotation procedure in the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) is followed. Therefore, a threshold value for tire overspeed event alert should be set and selected according to approved AFMs. In the AFM-DPI for 737NG, the value for tire speed rating is listed as 225 mph on the CONFIGURATION page, and Boeing recommends 225 mph or 195.5 knots as the limited ground speed for tire overspeed alert.

3、SR HNA-HNA-18-0855-02B

轮胎225的含义、超轮速了该怎么办、超轮速后是否应该更换刹车或轮胎。

对应地速195节,执行特检,有公司检查后放行。

Question 1:
What is the meaning of 225MPH on the tires’ sidewall? The airplane ground speed or the wheel speed?

Answer 1:
The tire speed and wheel speed is the same as they both move together as a single unit. It is important to remember that at high speeds, heat is generated within the tire structure. This heat, combined with extreme centrifugal forces from high rotational speeds, creates the potential for tread loss. Ensuring that tires are operated within their speed ratings will help prevent possible tread losses and the potential for airplane damage.

While rotation and liftoff/landing speeds are generally expressed in knots indicated airspeed, the tire speed limit is the ground speed, which is usually expressed in statute miles per hour. This means that a tire rated at 225 miles per hour is designed for a maximum ground speed at liftoff/landing of 195 knots.

Question 2:
When the speed of our airplane is out of 225MPH, how do maintenance recognize the overspeed information?

Answer 2:
When an overspeed landing is suspected, Boeing recommends performing AMM sub-task 05-51-07-210-801 when tires have been subjected to an overspeed landing above the rated tire speed. If the Step 2.A(4) brake energy calculation of that AMM shows that the landing was not in the CAUTION or FUSE PLUG MELT range and no fuse plugs actually melted, then only TASK 05-51-07-000-801 (Tire Removal After Overspeed Landing) needs to be accomplished.

If the Step 2.A(4) brake energy calculation shows that the landing was in either the CAUTION or FUSE PLUG MELT range or if any fuse plugs actually melted, then the appropriate additional AMM 05-51-07 inspections (High Energy Stop Conditional Inspection – In CAUTION range or the High Energy Stop Conditional Inspection – In FUSE PLUG MELT range) also need to be accomplished in addition to the tire removal.

Question 3:
If an overspeed event occurred, is it necessary that we should change the wheel or the tire?

Answer 3:
Some operators have elected to simply examine the tires after an overspeed takeoff/landing event using the normal tire inspection criteria in Chapter 32 of the AMM. If no damage is found, the airplanes are dispatched normally and no further maintenance actions are performed. Based on many years of service experience, this approach seems to have worked well because very few, if any, tire tread losses have been attributed to an overspeed event. Based on this service experience, Boeing has typically not objected to this practice.

4、SR HNA-HNA-24-0877-02B

向波音申请在195-198期间的超速情况,当段完成正常轮胎检查,航后更换。波音技术不反对。

Question 1:

What inspection is required to do for the takeoff tire overspeed and landing tire overspeed respectively?

Answer 1:

Boeing is aware that overspeed takeoffs and landings occasionally occur in the fleet and it is rare to see a tire fail simply due to a mild overspeed takeoff event, such as 2 – 3 miles per hour. Therefore, since there have been no tire overspeed takeoff / landings design requirements imposed or qualification tests performed, Boeing cannot formally approve allowing a wheel/tire assembly with overspeed takeoffs to remain in service. Hence, if a tire speed rating is exceeded (during takeoff or landing), Boeing recommends removing the tire from service. However, because of the fleet service history noted above, Boeing has No Technical Objection (NTO) for Operators to examine wheels/tires following a mild overspeed takeoff event (2 – 3 mph), using the existing criteria in Boeing’s 737NG AMM Task 32-45-00-700-803 ‘Tires – Inspection’. If no damage is found, Boeing is aware Operators have returned the tire into continued service. If this mild overspeed condition occurs, Boeing recommends that the tire serial numbers be recorded and that the tire retreader be informed of the overspeed event history when the tires are returned for retread. If a large overspeed condition has occured (above the 2 – 3 mph range), Boeing recommends the tire be removed from service as soon as the overspeed condition has been confirmed. Operating the tire in this condition can cause the tire to fail as explained in ‘Answer 2’ below.

Question 2:

What is the main influence, which the tire overspeed pose to the tire? Are there any inspections which can discover the overspeed status for tires?

Answer 2:

As noted in HNA-HNA-18-0855-02B, it is important to remember that at high speeds, heat is generated within the tire structure. This heat, combined with extreme centrifugal forces from high rotational speeds, creates the potential for tread loss. Ensuring that tires are operated within their speed ratings will help prevent possible tread losses and the potential for airplane damage. Unfortunately the only way to properly inspect the tire for damage is when the tire retreader performs its NDT inspections. This can only be done in a shop once the tire has been removed from the wheel.

Question 3:

HNA guess there is no risk when the groundspeed is less than 198 knots for the 225mph type tire according to the the article in the AERO magazine and the SR mentioned above. HNA is going to make a policy, when the groundspeed is between 195 and 198,the tires are arranged to be replaced in the first AF phase. Could BEOEING offer an NTO ?

Answer 3:

Boeing has No Technical Objection (NTO) if Hainan Airlines Holding creates a policy when an airplane exceeds 195 knots (224.4 mph) and performs the recommendations outlined in ‘Answer 1’ and ‘Answer 2’ above.

CFM56-7B的VSV作动环衬套丢失

Case #01967027

2024年4月,有飞机反映有多个VSV作动环衬套丢失,件号9944M44P01。

1、手册放行标准判断

根据AMM72-32-00-210-002-F00,第1第2级衬套允许缺失数量是3个;如缺失数量超过4个,200飞行循环修复;如缺失数量超过5个,则立即更换。衬套腿(leg)缺失是允许的,修复第1第2级新衬套也是把腿打断了才能安装。

对于第3级衬套,CFM认为由于第3级作动臂销向下定位,很难对作动环衬套进行潜在的检查。因此,第3级衬套没有要求检查。此外,CFM在每一级多达10个法兰衬套缺失的情况下做了相关测试,发现发动机的可操作性不会受到影响。鉴于此,在下一次飞行之前不需要采取进一步措施。尽管如此,CFM建议客户尽早更换丢失的衬套。

2、衬套更换

1)第1和第2级衬套可以根据AMM72-32-00-900-801-F00修复。第3级衬套可以根据AMM72-32-00-900-802-F00 (IGV和第3级作动臂和衬套的更换)和AMM72-32-00-900-804-F00(连接环更换)程序进行更换。除AMM程序所要求的以外,不需要任何测试。

2)第1第2级衬套在作动臂上部,修复不需要拆任何部件。修复步骤大致如下:清洁安装区域,剪掉衬套4个leg,将衬套塞进丢失位置,在衬套顶部外法兰涂上RTV106胶并固化。

第3级(和IGV)的衬套在作动臂下部,这也是不易检查,厂家也没有给出衬套损伤标准的原因。

就此与GE做了讨论,GE表示

Q1. 驱动环缺失衬套的根本原因是什么?是否与衬套的材料和设计缺陷有关?
答复:衬套由复合材料制成,会随使用时间推移发生磨损。

Q2. 针对驱动环缺失衬套问题,CFM是否有相关措施和改进计划?
答复:无,CFM目前未开展或计划开展任何与驱动环衬套耐久性相关的改进工作。

Q3. 为缩短固化时间,能否对RTV 106进行加热?
答复:根据RTV制造商技术数据表,固化时间受粘接面尺寸、温度和湿度影响。制造商指南指出:在77华氏度(25℃)和50%湿度环境下,1/8英寸(3.175毫米)厚胶层约需24小时完全固化——这与飞机维护手册(AMM)的指引一致。

Q4. 若Q3可行,建议的固化温度和时间参数如何设置?
答复:为缩短24小时固化时间,CFM推荐以下流程:

a)在执行AMM任务涂抹RTV 106至衬套时,同步在压舌板上涂抹等厚度RTV胶条,并将其置于高压压气机匣靠近安装衬套位置。在C型管道下方布置石英灯,对准带有修复衬套的VSV杠杆臂,灯具距离更换衬套1-3英尺(0.3-0.9米)。确保带有RTV 106的压舌板位于维修衬套同一区域。
b) 固化2小时后,用刀片切割压舌板胶条末端。若RTV 106已固化至中心层,触感应无粘性。若压舌板胶条切割处中心已固化,即可完成维修并使飞机恢复正常状态。
c) 若切割处中心未完全固化,则需继续使用石英灯辅助固化2小时,并重复上述(a)评估流程。
d) 按(a)(b)步骤持续评估RTV 106状态,最长不超过涂抹后24小时。满24小时后允许完成维修并使飞机恢复正常状态。

    注:CFM未提供变量(如灯具功率/距离)加速固化时间的具体指引。RTV 106(迈图高性能材料公司生产)技术数据表明确:”升温和加湿可加速固化,降温和干燥环境会延缓固化速率”,故推荐采用”测试样本”验证法。

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