关于起飞超轮速的历次波音沟通

1、SR HNA-HNA-24-0385-02B

为什么只有落地超轮速的特检AMM 05-51-07-000-801,没有起飞超轮速的特检。具体该如何操作。

因为波音没有执行过起飞超轮速的试验。

Boeing has reviewed Hainan Airlines’ inquiry and offers the following response:

Boeing is aware that overspeed takeoffs occasionally occur in the fleet and it is rare to see a tire fail simply due to a mild overspeed takeoff event. The potential tire problems resulting from a mild overspeed takeoff condition are problems which can also arise without an overspeed event, as they are most likely due to an existing fault (such as an internal separation or a deep cut that could result in a peeled rib or an entire tread loss). Boeing is unaware of any wheel failures that have occurred due to a mild overspeed takeoff event.

Since there have been no tire overspeed takeoff design requirements imposed or qualification tests performed, Boeing cannot formally approve allowing a wheel/tire assembly with overspeed takeoffs to remain in service. However, because of the fleet service history noted above Boeing has no technical objection if, in lieu of removal, operators examine wheels/tires following a very mild overspeed takeoff event using the existing criteria in AMM 32-45-00 TASK 32-45-00-700-803 and if no damage is found return the airplane to service. In addition, Boeing recommends that the tire serial numbers be recorded and that the tire retreader be informed of the overspeed event history when the tires are returned for retread. If Hainan Airlines decides to do this inspection/return to service in lieu of replacement please note that Hainan Airlines has the responsibility to coordinate with the appropriate regulatory agency (or agencies) to obtain all necessary approvals. If Hainan Airlines elects instead to remove the tires, the normal tire change inspection interval criteria (per applicable CMM) for the wheels is recommended.

Boeing has published an article in its AERO magazine that covers this topic (see Ref /A/ file attached). We suggest that Hainan Airlines review this article and in particular the section on Maintenance Actions near the end of the article.

2、SR HNA-HNA-21-1111

当出现起落架超轮速后,会有什么结果,能否放行。(225轮胎,安监的监控值为185节)

波音认为从部分航司的实际操作看,2-3节并没有发生问题。波音不反对这种情况。对于225的胎,建议设置监控为195.5。

Boeing is aware that, in China, due to advances in flight data recorder technology that enables easier data acquisition, widespread recognition of tire-speed-limit exceedance events during takeoff has been materialized. However, we have to caution our airline customers against rash decisions such as setting a warning threshold value as the safety check line.

There are no standardized industry maintenance guidelines if a tire speed exceedance occurs during takeoff. If the overspeed was very small (2 to 3 knots over the tires’ speed limit), it is unlikely that the tires would have suffered any damage. Some operators have elected to simply examine the tires after an overspeed takeoff event using the normal tire inspection criteria in the Airplane Maintenance Manual. If no damage is found, the airplanes are dispatched normally and no further maintenance actions are performed. Based on many years of service experience, this approach seems to have worked well, and Boeing has typically not objected to this practice because very few, if any, tire tread losses have been attributed to an overspeed event.

Note that tire speed ratings and tire overspeed capabilities are provided in the approved Boeing AFMs for 737 MAX, 777, 787 and 747-400/-8. For example, the following statements are included in all AFMs published for the 737 MAX:

Approved tires with a speed rating of at least 235 mph and a one-time overspeed capability of 260 mph must be installed on the airplane to utilize the allowable tire speed limit of 232 mph in AFM-DPI.

An option exists in AFM-DPI to utilize a reduced tire speed limit of 225 mph for approved tires with a speed rating of at least 225 mph and a one-time overspeed capability of 250 mph.

When an aircraft is dispatched in accordance with certification and operational regulations, the calculated takeoff performance guarantees that the airplane’s ground speed at the liftoff during takeoff ground roll will not exceed the tire speed rating (e.g. 225 mph or 195.5 knots for 737NG), provided Boeing-recommended all-engine normal takeoff rotation procedure in the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) is followed. Therefore, a threshold value for tire overspeed event alert should be set and selected according to approved AFMs. In the AFM-DPI for 737NG, the value for tire speed rating is listed as 225 mph on the CONFIGURATION page, and Boeing recommends 225 mph or 195.5 knots as the limited ground speed for tire overspeed alert.

3、SR HNA-HNA-18-0855-02B

轮胎225的含义、超轮速了该怎么办、超轮速后是否应该更换刹车或轮胎。

对应地速195节,执行特检,有公司检查后放行。

Question 1:
What is the meaning of 225MPH on the tires’ sidewall? The airplane ground speed or the wheel speed?

Answer 1:
The tire speed and wheel speed is the same as they both move together as a single unit. It is important to remember that at high speeds, heat is generated within the tire structure. This heat, combined with extreme centrifugal forces from high rotational speeds, creates the potential for tread loss. Ensuring that tires are operated within their speed ratings will help prevent possible tread losses and the potential for airplane damage.

While rotation and liftoff/landing speeds are generally expressed in knots indicated airspeed, the tire speed limit is the ground speed, which is usually expressed in statute miles per hour. This means that a tire rated at 225 miles per hour is designed for a maximum ground speed at liftoff/landing of 195 knots.

Question 2:
When the speed of our airplane is out of 225MPH, how do maintenance recognize the overspeed information?

Answer 2:
When an overspeed landing is suspected, Boeing recommends performing AMM sub-task 05-51-07-210-801 when tires have been subjected to an overspeed landing above the rated tire speed. If the Step 2.A(4) brake energy calculation of that AMM shows that the landing was not in the CAUTION or FUSE PLUG MELT range and no fuse plugs actually melted, then only TASK 05-51-07-000-801 (Tire Removal After Overspeed Landing) needs to be accomplished.

If the Step 2.A(4) brake energy calculation shows that the landing was in either the CAUTION or FUSE PLUG MELT range or if any fuse plugs actually melted, then the appropriate additional AMM 05-51-07 inspections (High Energy Stop Conditional Inspection – In CAUTION range or the High Energy Stop Conditional Inspection – In FUSE PLUG MELT range) also need to be accomplished in addition to the tire removal.

Question 3:
If an overspeed event occurred, is it necessary that we should change the wheel or the tire?

Answer 3:
Some operators have elected to simply examine the tires after an overspeed takeoff/landing event using the normal tire inspection criteria in Chapter 32 of the AMM. If no damage is found, the airplanes are dispatched normally and no further maintenance actions are performed. Based on many years of service experience, this approach seems to have worked well because very few, if any, tire tread losses have been attributed to an overspeed event. Based on this service experience, Boeing has typically not objected to this practice.

4、SR HNA-HNA-24-0877-02B

向波音申请在195-198期间的超速情况,当段完成正常轮胎检查,航后更换。波音技术不反对。

Question 1:

What inspection is required to do for the takeoff tire overspeed and landing tire overspeed respectively?

Answer 1:

Boeing is aware that overspeed takeoffs and landings occasionally occur in the fleet and it is rare to see a tire fail simply due to a mild overspeed takeoff event, such as 2 – 3 miles per hour. Therefore, since there have been no tire overspeed takeoff / landings design requirements imposed or qualification tests performed, Boeing cannot formally approve allowing a wheel/tire assembly with overspeed takeoffs to remain in service. Hence, if a tire speed rating is exceeded (during takeoff or landing), Boeing recommends removing the tire from service. However, because of the fleet service history noted above, Boeing has No Technical Objection (NTO) for Operators to examine wheels/tires following a mild overspeed takeoff event (2 – 3 mph), using the existing criteria in Boeing’s 737NG AMM Task 32-45-00-700-803 ‘Tires – Inspection’. If no damage is found, Boeing is aware Operators have returned the tire into continued service. If this mild overspeed condition occurs, Boeing recommends that the tire serial numbers be recorded and that the tire retreader be informed of the overspeed event history when the tires are returned for retread. If a large overspeed condition has occured (above the 2 – 3 mph range), Boeing recommends the tire be removed from service as soon as the overspeed condition has been confirmed. Operating the tire in this condition can cause the tire to fail as explained in ‘Answer 2’ below.

Question 2:

What is the main influence, which the tire overspeed pose to the tire? Are there any inspections which can discover the overspeed status for tires?

Answer 2:

As noted in HNA-HNA-18-0855-02B, it is important to remember that at high speeds, heat is generated within the tire structure. This heat, combined with extreme centrifugal forces from high rotational speeds, creates the potential for tread loss. Ensuring that tires are operated within their speed ratings will help prevent possible tread losses and the potential for airplane damage. Unfortunately the only way to properly inspect the tire for damage is when the tire retreader performs its NDT inspections. This can only be done in a shop once the tire has been removed from the wheel.

Question 3:

HNA guess there is no risk when the groundspeed is less than 198 knots for the 225mph type tire according to the the article in the AERO magazine and the SR mentioned above. HNA is going to make a policy, when the groundspeed is between 195 and 198,the tires are arranged to be replaced in the first AF phase. Could BEOEING offer an NTO ?

Answer 3:

Boeing has No Technical Objection (NTO) if Hainan Airlines Holding creates a policy when an airplane exceeds 195 knots (224.4 mph) and performs the recommendations outlined in ‘Answer 1’ and ‘Answer 2’ above.

前起落架舱锁传感器导线保护圈排水口

SR HNA-HNA-24-0600-02B

2024年3月,有飞机反映前起落架舱锁传感器导线保护层有损伤, 在更换过程中发现新零件中有三个小孔(详见附件1),但旧零件中没有。通过查看了图纸DWG287A6212,发现导管有两个排水孔。波音表示这三个孔都是排水口,参考图纸DWG 287A6212 SH7。根据图纸287A6212 SH15,第一个排水孔应穿过导管(仅一侧),位置如适用导管装配图所示。每个连续的孔沿着导管的长度与前一个孔间隔约.3750英寸,并在导管圆周周围以约120度的间隔径向定位。孔应位于波纹顶部。所有孔直径为.1250+/-.0300。

跑道状况代码(RWYCC)

来源于网络

跑道状况代码(RWYCC): 用来描述跑道表面状况的数字,可以直接表示道面状况对航空器滑跑性能(主要指着陆滑跑性能)的影响。

  • 6 -干跑道。
  • 5-轮胎上施加的制动力所达到的减速效果正常,并且能正常控制方向。
  • 4-制动减速或方向控制能力在好与中之间。
  • 3-轮胎上施加的制动力所达到减速效果明显降低或方向控制能力明显降低。
  • 2-制动减速或方向控制能力在中与差之间。
  • 1-轮胎上施加的制动力所达到的减速效果大幅度降低或方向控制困难。
  • 0- 轮胎上施加的制动力所达到的减速效果几乎为零或无法控制方向。

跑道表面状况(RSC):跑道状况报告中关于跑道表面状况的一种说明,可作为确定跑道状况代码、计算飞机性能的依据。

干跑道:跑道正在或计划使用的长度和宽度范围内的表面区域内,其表面无可见湿气且未被压实的雪、干雪、湿雪、雪浆、霜、冰和积水等污染物污染。

湿跑道:跑道正在或计划使用的长度和宽度范围内的表面区域内,覆盖有任何明显的湿气或不超过3毫米深的水。

湿滑跑道:湿跑道,而且其相当一部分的跑道表面摩阻特性确定为已经降级。

污染跑道:跑道正在或计划使用的长度和宽度范围内的表面区域,有很大一部分(不管是否为孤立区域)都覆盖有压实的雪、干雪、湿雪、雪浆、霜、冰和积水等一种或多种污染物。

跑道污染物

  • 压实的雪(COMPACTED SNOW):已被压成固态状的雪,使得航空器轮胎碾压后不会进一步大幅压实表面或在表面形成凹痕。
  • 干雪(DRY SNOW):不容易形成雪球的雪。
  • 霜(FROST):霜由温度低于冰点的表面上的空中潮气所形成的
  • 冰晶构成。霜与冰的不同点在于,霜晶单独增长,因此粒状构造特征更为明显。
  • 冰(ICE):已结成冰的水或在寒冷且干燥条件下已转变成冰的压实的雪。
  • 雪浆(SLUSH):水分饱和度非常高,使得用手捧起时,水将从中流出,或者用力踩踏时会溅开的雪。
  • 积水(STANDING WATER):从飞机性能角度考虑,位于使用之中的所需长度和宽度范围内的跑道表面区域(不管是否为孤立区域 )的 25%以上覆盖有超出 3毫米深的水。
  • 湿冰(WETICE):表面有水的冰或者正在融化的冰。
  • 湿雪(WET SNOW):所含水分足以能够滚出一个压得很实的实心雪球但却挤不出水分的雪。
  • 润湿(DAMP):表面由于湿气而颜色有所改变。
  • 潮湿(WET ):表面已湿透但并无积水。

维修相关

(1)MEL中M项或MI项涉及“跑道”、“积水”、“雪”关键字相关的描述、条款主要来源于DDG或MMEL,与厂家文件保持一致。

(2)AC提及“严重磨损的轮胎不适于在湿跑道或污染跑道上运行”,对此我们的解读是,对于轮胎的磨损标准,均遵守波音或空客的AMM的定义,此项可符合;

(3)没有下发过相关TA要求。

MEL涉及的项目主要为签派自建项目。

737子午胎疑似鼓包

ISO-32-25-49417

2023年10月,有两架飞机发生子午胎的前轮疑似鼓包的现象,一架为737MAX,一架为737NG的高高原飞机。

高高原

PN 275Q29-1, SN 90132773,翻修次数: R1,截止鼓包发生已使用99CY。

MAX

PN 275Q29-1, SN 22901243,翻修次数:R0. 截止鼓包发生之日已使用122CY。

与厂家沟通,厂家认为这个不是鼓包,是胎侧的一个起伏。是子午胎的一个排线特性造成的。这种起伏它是从胎圈向胎面方向一个轻微的凸起,并且很小,可以参考GOODYEAR的SL评估,厂家认为可以继续使用的。鼓包通常是里面有分层,一般会在局部鼓起比如一个小球一样的形状,并且按上去是软的。

SL 2019-32-004的内容如下:

子午线飞机轮胎由多层(层)橡胶涂层尼龙帘线组装而成,这些帘线从胎圈到胎圈呈径向排列。在组装过程中,通过重叠端部将帘线层固定在一起。这可能会导致轻微的胎侧波纹或凸起,这是子午线轮胎结构的正常现象。根据下文所述的拆卸标准,可见的胎侧波纹在持续使用中不会产生安全或性能问题。

标准:任何侧壁波纹(深度或高度)为3毫米(0.12英寸)或更小的子午线轮胎都可以继续使用。任何侧壁波纹深度或高度超过3毫米的轮胎需要在下一次便利维修机会拆除。

检查步骤

1. 检查每个轮胎侧壁是否有起伏。

2.对于检查过程中发现的任何侧壁起伏:

a. 波纹应仅在从胎肩到胎圈的径向路径上运行。

b. 与周围材料相比,起伏不应显得更柔和。

c. 任何波纹的最大允许深度或高度,为周围75毫米侧壁范围内的+/-3毫米(沿圆周测量)。

注意:该测量可以在沿侧壁长度的任何地方进行,从靠近轮轴的区域到胎面边缘。

3. 符合这些标准的轮胎可以继续使用。

2025年4月,FIX补充。

(点评:看来确实是子午胎特性,如下案例使用的为不同的轮毂和胎皮供应商,也发生了相同特征的情况。)

自2018年投入运营以来,阿曼航空的737-8 MAX机队一直在运行。目前737-8机队规模为15架飞机。在过去18个月(2024年和2025年),我们大约收到21份关于米其林子午胎轮胎P/N M19001在胎侧和/或胎圈区域出现鼓包的报告,这令人担忧。大多数(如果不是全部)案例都是在轮胎处于翻新级别R1时报告的。米其林正在调查根本原因。

背景:这些鼓包是在航班检查、日常检查期间,以及有时在轮胎磨损到极限后被拆下,在轮毂车间拆解轮毂之前被认证的维修技术人员发现的。

零部件信息:米其林子午轮胎H44.5X16.5R21 30 PR,235英里/小时(波音P/N S294W502-253)。注意:阿曼航空使用古德里奇主轮P/N 3-1674,以及古德里奇碳刹车2-1740-1。

供应商信息:米其林。目前正在调查这些鼓包的根本原因。

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