罕见的APU SCU导致TRU灯亮

来自于网络公众号

某机落地接上APU GEN R后,关闭右发执行单发滑行,TR UNIT灯亮,机组检查发现TRU1无电,TRU2、3正常,接APU GEN L后TRU灯灭。

试车验证,试车数据如下:

验证的结果如下:

1)单开左发与APU,左发接1号汇流条,APU接2号汇流条,TRU灯亮。

2)单开右发与APU,右发接2号汇流条,APU接1号汇流条,TRU灯亮。

3)双发启动,左、右发分别接入1号2号汇流条,TRU灯灭。

4)通过对比其他飞机,发现一个异常。正常飞机的APU电流117V AC,正常,故障飞机的APU电流 127V AC明显过大

5)排故更换SCU后,APU供电电压115V变正常了,试车验证TRU故障消失了。

故障分析:

1、由最后排故结果倒推,双发同时供电时,APU电门(左或右)任一个接通,接通一侧的汇流条由APU供电,就会造成对侧发动机供电的汇流条TRU灯亮。整机都由APU供电,TRU灯就能恢复。整机由发动机供电TRU也正常。

2、结合电路原理可以得知电源之间是互相干扰的,输出电压高的会抑制输出电压低的,TRU又是对三相电较为敏感部件,所以其中一个TRU输出电流变小,就会导致TRU灯亮。

3、此次故障的主要原因是APU SCU调压功能失效,错误的将APU发电机输出电压调高到127V(正常应该是115V),一旦APU向单侧电网供电,另一侧的电网供向TRU的电就会被抑制,造成TRU电流变小,TR UNIT灯亮。

经验总结:

如果碰到TRU灯亮的故障,也可以检查一下GPU、APU、IDG的三相交流电压,如电压过高则不正常。

737NG-FTD-35-24001

Oxygen Generator Not Secured in Passenger Service Unit (PSU)/氧气发生器未有效固定

一、适用性:

737NG 737MAX

二、描述:

波音公司收到了来自化学氧气发生器(COG)运营商的报告,这些发生器在乘客服务单元(PSU)组件内出现了位置偏移。

737系列飞机通过一个12或22分钟的COG为每个PSU提供补充氧气,该COG通过两条紧固的不锈钢带安装在PSU顶部。每个固定带都有一个硅胶隔离垫,用作热保护并固定COG。COG保持力的损失是由保持带硅胶隔离(热)垫上使用的压敏粘合剂(PSA)失效引起的。PSA材料的测试表明,各批次的性能存在差异。这种故障模式仅在2019年8月16日至2023年11月15日期间制造的737 MAX/NG波音Sky Interior(BSI)PSU设计中注意到,该设计在固定带上使用PSA热垫。类型设计允许在发电机固定带上采用两种可能的热垫配置(PSA和非PSA)。波音公司持续运行安全计划(COSP)程序已将这种情况确定为人身安全问题。在减压事件中,乘客可能很难或不可能启动向后移动足够远(偏离位置)的发电机。过度迁移也可能影响口罩软管并限制氧气的流动。COG无法启动或软管碰撞可能导致在客舱减压期间无法提供补充氧气,如果不采取缓解措施,可能会对乘客造成严重或致命伤害。

三、状态:

波音公司已启动服务相关问题(SRP)737MAX-SRP-35-0076调查该问题。

四、临时措施:

五、最终措施:

波音公司将发布737NG(SB 737-35-1211)和737 MAX(SB 73735–1210)的特别注意服务公告(SB),通知运营商供应商(Astronics PECO,股份有限公司)的服务公告,以检查和/或相应修改PSU和零件标记。
波音公司了解到,美国联邦航空管理局(FAA)正在审查这一问题,以便采取可能的监管行动。波音公司预计美国联邦航空管理局将强制发布服务公告。

2024年9月4日,案例补充

B-56*6飞机,在执行52A检,执行工卡JC-EO-73N-35-2024-001(氧气发生器和隔热垫的检查和更换),检查发现45ABC处氧气发生器缺少1个卡箍,该卡箍的1个固定螺钉和1个隔热垫也缺失。卡箍(PN: 69756 1EA) ,螺钉(PN: NAS1301-6-10 1EA)

中央油箱的诸多最低油量要求

SR HNA-HNA-24-0819-03B

在手册中,对于中央油箱油量要求有诸多的限制,且各不相同,为此与波音做了沟通,不同油量究竟是出于什么要求。相关解释如下。

1, FIM 28-22 TASK 801(Center Tank Left Fuel Pump LOW PRESSURE Light is ON – Fault Isolation), it requires a minimum fuel of 14,000 lb (6350 kg) .

  • 14,000 lbs. is a minimum amount of fuel required in the center tank to ensure the fuel pump will re-prime and will developed fuel pressure for the test.

2, FIM 28-22 TASK 817(Center Tank, Left Boost Pump Circuit Breaker Open – Fault Isolation), it requires a minimum fuel of 20,000 lb (9072 kg)  .

  •  20,000 lbs. is to ensure the pump inlets are covered for safety to protect against introducing an ignition source/ electrical short in the fuel tank. Note that FIM 28-22 TASK 817 specifically addresses an open circuit breaker fault.

3, AMM 28-22-41-720-802(Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) – Operational Test), it requires a minimum fuel of 2000 lb (907 kg)  .

  •   2,000 lbs. is to ensure the fuel pump will not auto-shutoff.

4, AMM 28-22-00-730-801(Engine Fuel Feed Pumps – Functional Test), it requires a minimum fuel of 1000 lb (454 kg)  .

  •  2,000 lbs. is to ensure the fuel pump will not auto-shutoff – Note AMM** will be updated from 1,000 to 2,000 lbs of fuel.(This change is scheduled to be incorporated in the 15-Oct-2024 revision of the 737NG AMM.)

静变流机的TERMINAL BLOCK安装注意

2024年4月,有飞机反映ELEC灯亮,自检有静变流机故障,飞机更换新的静变流机后,检查发现静变流机的TERMINAL BLOCK COVER无法装上,进一步检查发现静变流机本体的负极接线桩有突出,导致TERMINAL BLOCK COVER无法装上,该接线桩无法拧回,且无松动。

需要注意的是磅力矩时正极和负极的力矩是不一样的。正极135-155,负极65-85。先磅的正极,紧接着磅负极时没调大小,将有可能将接线螺栓拉出。需安装中注意。

关于起飞超轮速的历次波音沟通

1、SR HNA-HNA-24-0385-02B

为什么只有落地超轮速的特检AMM 05-51-07-000-801,没有起飞超轮速的特检。具体该如何操作。

因为波音没有执行过起飞超轮速的试验。

Boeing has reviewed Hainan Airlines’ inquiry and offers the following response:

Boeing is aware that overspeed takeoffs occasionally occur in the fleet and it is rare to see a tire fail simply due to a mild overspeed takeoff event. The potential tire problems resulting from a mild overspeed takeoff condition are problems which can also arise without an overspeed event, as they are most likely due to an existing fault (such as an internal separation or a deep cut that could result in a peeled rib or an entire tread loss). Boeing is unaware of any wheel failures that have occurred due to a mild overspeed takeoff event.

Since there have been no tire overspeed takeoff design requirements imposed or qualification tests performed, Boeing cannot formally approve allowing a wheel/tire assembly with overspeed takeoffs to remain in service. However, because of the fleet service history noted above Boeing has no technical objection if, in lieu of removal, operators examine wheels/tires following a very mild overspeed takeoff event using the existing criteria in AMM 32-45-00 TASK 32-45-00-700-803 and if no damage is found return the airplane to service. In addition, Boeing recommends that the tire serial numbers be recorded and that the tire retreader be informed of the overspeed event history when the tires are returned for retread. If Hainan Airlines decides to do this inspection/return to service in lieu of replacement please note that Hainan Airlines has the responsibility to coordinate with the appropriate regulatory agency (or agencies) to obtain all necessary approvals. If Hainan Airlines elects instead to remove the tires, the normal tire change inspection interval criteria (per applicable CMM) for the wheels is recommended.

Boeing has published an article in its AERO magazine that covers this topic (see Ref /A/ file attached). We suggest that Hainan Airlines review this article and in particular the section on Maintenance Actions near the end of the article.

2、SR HNA-HNA-21-1111

当出现起落架超轮速后,会有什么结果,能否放行。(225轮胎,安监的监控值为185节)

波音认为从部分航司的实际操作看,2-3节并没有发生问题。波音不反对这种情况。对于225的胎,建议设置监控为195.5。

Boeing is aware that, in China, due to advances in flight data recorder technology that enables easier data acquisition, widespread recognition of tire-speed-limit exceedance events during takeoff has been materialized. However, we have to caution our airline customers against rash decisions such as setting a warning threshold value as the safety check line.

There are no standardized industry maintenance guidelines if a tire speed exceedance occurs during takeoff. If the overspeed was very small (2 to 3 knots over the tires’ speed limit), it is unlikely that the tires would have suffered any damage. Some operators have elected to simply examine the tires after an overspeed takeoff event using the normal tire inspection criteria in the Airplane Maintenance Manual. If no damage is found, the airplanes are dispatched normally and no further maintenance actions are performed. Based on many years of service experience, this approach seems to have worked well, and Boeing has typically not objected to this practice because very few, if any, tire tread losses have been attributed to an overspeed event.

Note that tire speed ratings and tire overspeed capabilities are provided in the approved Boeing AFMs for 737 MAX, 777, 787 and 747-400/-8. For example, the following statements are included in all AFMs published for the 737 MAX:

Approved tires with a speed rating of at least 235 mph and a one-time overspeed capability of 260 mph must be installed on the airplane to utilize the allowable tire speed limit of 232 mph in AFM-DPI.

An option exists in AFM-DPI to utilize a reduced tire speed limit of 225 mph for approved tires with a speed rating of at least 225 mph and a one-time overspeed capability of 250 mph.

When an aircraft is dispatched in accordance with certification and operational regulations, the calculated takeoff performance guarantees that the airplane’s ground speed at the liftoff during takeoff ground roll will not exceed the tire speed rating (e.g. 225 mph or 195.5 knots for 737NG), provided Boeing-recommended all-engine normal takeoff rotation procedure in the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) is followed. Therefore, a threshold value for tire overspeed event alert should be set and selected according to approved AFMs. In the AFM-DPI for 737NG, the value for tire speed rating is listed as 225 mph on the CONFIGURATION page, and Boeing recommends 225 mph or 195.5 knots as the limited ground speed for tire overspeed alert.

3、SR HNA-HNA-18-0855-02B

轮胎225的含义、超轮速了该怎么办、超轮速后是否应该更换刹车或轮胎。

对应地速195节,执行特检,有公司检查后放行。

Question 1:
What is the meaning of 225MPH on the tires’ sidewall? The airplane ground speed or the wheel speed?

Answer 1:
The tire speed and wheel speed is the same as they both move together as a single unit. It is important to remember that at high speeds, heat is generated within the tire structure. This heat, combined with extreme centrifugal forces from high rotational speeds, creates the potential for tread loss. Ensuring that tires are operated within their speed ratings will help prevent possible tread losses and the potential for airplane damage.

While rotation and liftoff/landing speeds are generally expressed in knots indicated airspeed, the tire speed limit is the ground speed, which is usually expressed in statute miles per hour. This means that a tire rated at 225 miles per hour is designed for a maximum ground speed at liftoff/landing of 195 knots.

Question 2:
When the speed of our airplane is out of 225MPH, how do maintenance recognize the overspeed information?

Answer 2:
When an overspeed landing is suspected, Boeing recommends performing AMM sub-task 05-51-07-210-801 when tires have been subjected to an overspeed landing above the rated tire speed. If the Step 2.A(4) brake energy calculation of that AMM shows that the landing was not in the CAUTION or FUSE PLUG MELT range and no fuse plugs actually melted, then only TASK 05-51-07-000-801 (Tire Removal After Overspeed Landing) needs to be accomplished.

If the Step 2.A(4) brake energy calculation shows that the landing was in either the CAUTION or FUSE PLUG MELT range or if any fuse plugs actually melted, then the appropriate additional AMM 05-51-07 inspections (High Energy Stop Conditional Inspection – In CAUTION range or the High Energy Stop Conditional Inspection – In FUSE PLUG MELT range) also need to be accomplished in addition to the tire removal.

Question 3:
If an overspeed event occurred, is it necessary that we should change the wheel or the tire?

Answer 3:
Some operators have elected to simply examine the tires after an overspeed takeoff/landing event using the normal tire inspection criteria in Chapter 32 of the AMM. If no damage is found, the airplanes are dispatched normally and no further maintenance actions are performed. Based on many years of service experience, this approach seems to have worked well because very few, if any, tire tread losses have been attributed to an overspeed event. Based on this service experience, Boeing has typically not objected to this practice.

4、SR HNA-HNA-24-0877-02B

向波音申请在195-198期间的超速情况,当段完成正常轮胎检查,航后更换。波音技术不反对。

Question 1:

What inspection is required to do for the takeoff tire overspeed and landing tire overspeed respectively?

Answer 1:

Boeing is aware that overspeed takeoffs and landings occasionally occur in the fleet and it is rare to see a tire fail simply due to a mild overspeed takeoff event, such as 2 – 3 miles per hour. Therefore, since there have been no tire overspeed takeoff / landings design requirements imposed or qualification tests performed, Boeing cannot formally approve allowing a wheel/tire assembly with overspeed takeoffs to remain in service. Hence, if a tire speed rating is exceeded (during takeoff or landing), Boeing recommends removing the tire from service. However, because of the fleet service history noted above, Boeing has No Technical Objection (NTO) for Operators to examine wheels/tires following a mild overspeed takeoff event (2 – 3 mph), using the existing criteria in Boeing’s 737NG AMM Task 32-45-00-700-803 ‘Tires – Inspection’. If no damage is found, Boeing is aware Operators have returned the tire into continued service. If this mild overspeed condition occurs, Boeing recommends that the tire serial numbers be recorded and that the tire retreader be informed of the overspeed event history when the tires are returned for retread. If a large overspeed condition has occured (above the 2 – 3 mph range), Boeing recommends the tire be removed from service as soon as the overspeed condition has been confirmed. Operating the tire in this condition can cause the tire to fail as explained in ‘Answer 2’ below.

Question 2:

What is the main influence, which the tire overspeed pose to the tire? Are there any inspections which can discover the overspeed status for tires?

Answer 2:

As noted in HNA-HNA-18-0855-02B, it is important to remember that at high speeds, heat is generated within the tire structure. This heat, combined with extreme centrifugal forces from high rotational speeds, creates the potential for tread loss. Ensuring that tires are operated within their speed ratings will help prevent possible tread losses and the potential for airplane damage. Unfortunately the only way to properly inspect the tire for damage is when the tire retreader performs its NDT inspections. This can only be done in a shop once the tire has been removed from the wheel.

Question 3:

HNA guess there is no risk when the groundspeed is less than 198 knots for the 225mph type tire according to the the article in the AERO magazine and the SR mentioned above. HNA is going to make a policy, when the groundspeed is between 195 and 198,the tires are arranged to be replaced in the first AF phase. Could BEOEING offer an NTO ?

Answer 3:

Boeing has No Technical Objection (NTO) if Hainan Airlines Holding creates a policy when an airplane exceeds 195 knots (224.4 mph) and performs the recommendations outlined in ‘Answer 1’ and ‘Answer 2’ above.

[ Back To Top ]